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Abstract- In this paper, security analysis of block ciphers with key 
length greater than block length is proposed. When key length is 
significantly greater than block length and the statistical 
distribution of cipher system is like a uniform distribution, there 
are more than one key which map fixed input to fixed output. If a 
block cipher designed sufficiently random, it is expected that the 
key space can be classified into same classes.   Using such classes 
of keys, our proposed algorithm would be able to recover the key 
of block cipher with complexity  { }( )nkn ,maxO −22  where n is 
block length and k is key length. We applied our algorithm to 2-
round KASUMI block cipher as sample block cipher by using 
weakness of functions that used in KASUMI. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
  In design of secure block cipher, one of the main steps is 
selection of key and input block length. There are some 
standard block ciphers like KASUMI , IDEA, 3DES, AES-256 
which have block length smaller than key length. Since these 
ciphers have considered as pseudo-random generator, their key 
space can be classified into equivalency class of keys with the 
same number of elements. For instance, assuming randomness 
of KASUMI’s output, the key space would have 642 key 
classes which each contains 642 different keys. 
In our proposed attack algorithm, we assumed that there is 
an efficient algorithm which computes the equivalency class of 
an arbitrary key. 
As an application of this method, we propose an efficient 
algorithm for computing equivalency class of arbitrary key for 
one-round and 2-round KASUMI block cipher which can be 
extended to full round KASUMI. Hence, in the rest, we give a 
short introduction to KASUMI block cipher.  
KASUMI is modified version of the block cipher MISTY1 
[1], which is optimized for hardware performance. In the past 
few years, it has received a lot of attentions from the 
cryptographic researcher. Kuhn introduced the impossible 
differential attack on 6-round KASUMI [2], which has been 
recently extended to 7-round KASUMI[3]. In 2007, a higher 
order differential attack has been published on 5-round 
KASUMI with practical complexity [4]. Since the key schedule 
of KASUMI is linear, many related-key attacks have published. 
A related-key differential attack on 6-round KASUMI has 
presented in 2002[5]. The first related-key attack on the full 8-
round KASUMI was proposed by Biham et al.with 76.12  
encryptions [6], which was improved to a practical related-key 
attack on the full KASUMI by Dunkelman et al.[7] 
   However, assumption for these kinds of attacks is controlling 
over the differences of two or more related keys in all the 128 
key bits. With this assumption, resulting attack is inapplicable 
in most real-world usage scenarios [8].  
  In this paper, we proposed a new attack based on relation 
between key length and block length of a block cipher. When 
key length is significantly greater than block length and cipher 
system has a statistical properties like an uniform distribution, 
there is a key classes with nk −2  members K in 
which ( ) 0C=K,PE 0 , for every fixed ( )0C,P0  pair, where 
{ } { } { }nkn ,,,E 101010: →× is corresponding encryption 
algorithm[9]. 
Using this observation, we construct an equivalency class 
of those keys satisfied in ( ) 0C=K,PE 0 . In the rest of this 
paper,  we assume that for every block cipher algorithm E, 
there is an algorithm which computes efficiently the 
equivalency class of an arbitrary key. Our method can be 
applied to block cipher like KASUMI, IDEA, AES-256, 3DES, 
etc. 
In this paper, first we introduce our new method and then it 
will apply to reduced-round KASUMI block cipher.  In section 
II, we introduce details of our method. In section III, the 
method has applied to KASUMI. In section V, we propose an 
algorithm for generating equivalency classes of KASUMI key 
space.  Finally, after experimental results, we will give some 
suggestions and recommendations for future works. 
 
 
II. OUR PROPOSED ATTACK 
Consider a block cipher algorithm 
{ } { } { }nkn ,,,E 101010: →×  in which n is block length and k 
is key length. 
When key length is significantly greater than block length 
and the statistical distribution of cipher system is like a uniform 
distribution, there are nk −2  keys K such that  
( ) 0C=K,PE 0  
For every fixed ( ) { } { }nn0 ,,C,P 10100 ×∈ . 
It simply can prove that the following relation is an 
equivalency relation.  
K'K ~
 iff  ( ) ( ) 0C=K',PE=K,PE 00  
For all { }n0 ,C,P 10)( 0 ∈ . 
In the rest of the paper, [ ]
00 c,
K P  is Equivalency relation 
for { }k,K 10∈ . For every block cipher algorithm E, suppose 
that there is an algorithm which efficiently computes the 
equivalency class of an arbitrary key. 
Following algorithm will be able to recover the unknown 
key 0K  such that ( ) 00 C=K,PE 0 , for known ( )0C,P0  with 
complexity n2 .  
Algorithm 1: 
1.  Select the key K such that ( ) 0C=K,PE 0 . 
We use pseudo-randomness properties of encryption 
algorithm and it is expected that there is exactly one key such 
that ( ) 0C=K,PE 0  for every interval ( )[ ]nn +i,i 212 ××  
and nki −≤≤ 20 . For finding equivalence key, it would be 
sufficient to search whole keys in [ ]120 −n, . It can be done 
using rainbow-tables and time-memory-data-trade-off methods 
with complexity lower than 2n . 
2. Since [ ]
0P c,
KK
00
∈ , generate the keys of 
class [ ]
0P c,
K
0
. If an arbitrary key decrypts at least three pair 
(cipher-text, plain-text) correctly, select it as main unknown 
key. 
 
 
III. A KEY CLASSIFICATION ATTACK ON KASUMI 2-
ROUNDS BLOCK CIPHER  
 
In this section, we apply our proposed method to 2-rounds 
KASUMI block cipher. By finding some weakness in FO and 
FL functions, we will improve our method by using them. In 
the rest, first we introduce briefly the general structure of 
KASUMI block cipher and then properties of functions that 
used in KASUMI are discussed. 
A. KASUMI block cipher 
KASUMI is a block cipher used in the security of 3GPP 
systems such as UMTS, GSM and GPRS. Both the 
confidentiality (f8) and integrity function (f9) in UMTS are 
based on KASUMI. In GSM, KASUMI is used in the A5/3 
algorithm for generating key stream and in GPRS in the GEA3 
key stream generator. 
 KASUMI is an 8-round Feistel block cipher algorithm; it 
operates on 64 bit input to produce 64 bit output under a 128-
bit key. In each round, there are two functions: the FO function 
which is a 3-round, 32-bit Feistel structure, and the FL function 
which receives 32-bit as input and produces 32-bit output. The 
order of using two mentioned functions in the cipher is affected 
by the round number. In the odd round the first function is FL 
and in the even round the FO function is used first.  
The FO function also uses four-round Feistel FI function in 
a recursive structure. The FI function receives 16-bit as input 
and produce 16-bit as output. It uses two S-boxes S7 ( 7-bit to 
7-bit permutation) and S9 (9-bit to 9-bit permutation).  
Using a simple key schedule of figure 1, the round function 
uses a round key which consists of eight 16-bit sub keys 
derived from the original 128-bit key. The FL function uses 32-
bit sub-keys  ji,KL  in round I where j=1 or 2. The FO 
function uses 96-bit sub-keys ji,KO and ji,KI . 
 The 128-bit key K is divided into eight 16-bit sub keys Ki: 
Figure 1.  Key schedule for KASUMI block cipher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.   structure of KASUMI block cipher 
We start with FI function which is the core function for 
giving non-linearity to the cipher algorithm. 
B. FI function properties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  FI function   
 
One of the main functions used in KASUMI block cipher is  
{ } { } { }161616 101010: ,,,FI →×  
As figure 3 show, there are two -boxes S7 (7-bit to 7-bit 
permutation) and S9 (9-bit to 9-bit permutation). In the 
following, we give some properties for the FI function. 
1. ( ) ( )( )xFIKIFI=KIx,FI 12 ⊕  
where 1FI  is above half of the FI function before the key KI 
affects and  2FI  is below half of the FI function after the key 
KI affects. 
   It is clear that 1FI and 2FI  are invertible functions that are 
not depended on key. 
      2. Suppose that 
  ( ) y=KIx,FI                                             (1) 
 Where x, y and KI are input, output and key. Having two 
members of the set {x,y,KI}, the third one is uniquely 
computed efficiently. In fact, if {x,KI} or {y,KI} is known, 
using encryption and decryption algorithm,  (1) holds. 
If {x,y} is known, then 
( ) ( )yFIxFI=KI 121 −⊕  
3. ( ) ( ){ }| | 322=y=KIx,FI;KIx,  
  for every { }1610,y ∈ . 
4. Find KI and KI' for every { }1610,x'x, ∈  such that 
( ) ( )KI',x'FI=KIx,FI  
In fact, it is sufficient to find keys such that  
( ) ( )x'FIxFI=KI'KI 11 ⊕⊕                               (2) 
It is clear that the number of keys which (2) hold are 162 . 
5. There are some key pairs KI, KI' such that  
           ( ) ( ) y=KI',x'FI=KIx,FI  
For all { }1610,y,x'x, ∈ . 
Using the results of part 2, there are two keys pair with above 
properties. 
 
C. FO function properties 
 
{ } { } { }329632 101010: ,,,FO →×  is one of the core 
functions that used in KASUMI block cipher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  FO function 
 
Suppose ( )RL X,X=X  and ( )RL Y,Y=Y  
are input and output of FO function, then  
 
( )11LRL KI,KOXFIX=Y ⊕⊕  
( )22R KI,KOXFI ⊕⊕                                  (3) 
⊕LR Y=Y  
( )( )3311LR KI,KOKI,KOXFIXFI ⊕⊕⊕  
(4) 
Equation (4) can be rewritten as follow. 
( ) =KOKI,YYFI 33RL1 ⊕⊕−  
( )11LR KI,KOXFIX ⊕⊕                              (5) 
Finally, we have  
( )=KI,KOXFIX 11LR ⊕⊕  
( )22RL KI,KOXFIY ⊕⊕  
( ) 33RL1 KOKI,YYFI= ⊕⊕−               (6) 
 
When input and output of the FO function (X ,Y) are 
known, then there are 642  keys K such that FO(X,K)=Y. 
For arbitrary values of  { }1610,KI,KI,KO,KI 3211 ∈ , 
32 KO,KO  can be computed efficiently and uniquely. 
  
D. FL function properties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  FL function 
FL function { } { } { }323232 101010: ,,,FL →×  is one the 
simple components in the KASUMI block cipher. We 
introduce some properties of FL function. 
1. By fixing FL sub-keys, the function is one-to-one 
related to the input. But this isn't correct for the sub-
keys by fixing the input. 
2. If  ( )RL X,X=X  , ( )RL Y,Y=Y  are  input,  output 
of the FL function,  and ( )21 KL,KL=KL  is the 
corresponding sub-key, then  
( )
( ) 1LRR
2RLL
KLX=XY
KLY=XY
∧
∨
>>
>>
1
1
⊕
⊕                                     (7) 
 
Using (7), it is possible to classify all the FL sub-keys. 
 
IV. AN ALGORITHM FOR GENERATING EQUIVALENCE KEYS 
IN THE FIRST ROUND 
In this section, using mentioned properties for function that 
used in KASUMI, we propose an efficient algorithm for 
finding class of keys which map fixed input 0P to fixed output 
0C  for { }640 10,C,P 0 ∈ ( 0C  is the output of the first round 
before substitution of two halves)  
 
Algorithm 2: 
 
Given ( ) ( )RL0RL C,C=C,P,P=P0  
Find every { }12810,K ∈  such that 
( ) 0round C=K,PKASUMI 01−  
For ( ) { }9610,KI,KI,KI,KO,KL,KL 321121 ∈ do 
        find ( ) { }3210,KO,KO 32 ∈ such       
that ( )( ) RLR C=KOKI,,KL,PFLFOP ⊕  
 
Using FO function properties, we will be able to search 
efficiently desired key values. 
( )321 KO,KO,KO=KO , ( )321 KI,KI,KI=KI . 
There are 962 different keys K that  
( ) 0round1 C=K,PKASUMI 0−  for fixed { }640 10,C,P 0 ∈ . 
The sub-keys values ( ) { }3210,KO,KO 32 ∈  can be computed 
efficiently for every guess of sub-
keys ( ) { }9610,KI,KI,KI,KO,KL,KL 321121 ∈ . Therefore 
current algorithm is efficient since the complexity of algorithm 
is 962  and this is the best complexity with regard to the 
number of key bits. 
 
V. AN ALGORITHM FOR GENERATING EQUIVALENCE KEYS 
IN THE SECOND ROUND 
We extend our algorithm to 2-rounds KASUMI.  It is 
expected that there are 642  members in [ ]
0P c,
K
0
 for fixed 
{ }640 10,C,P 0 ∈ ( 0C  is the output of the second round before 
substitution of two halves). Since we are in the initial rounds of 
KASUMI and the statistical properties of the cipher algorithm 
are not complete, the number of elements of class [ ]
0P c,
K
0
 
may not be similar to that we expected. 
According to cipher structure, there are some relations 
between input and output of 2-round KASUMI block cipher as 
follow. 
 ( )( )
( )( )222LLR
111LRL
RKL,RKI,RKO,CFOFL=PC
RKI,RKO,RKL,PFLFO=PC
⊕
⊕  
Where 1RKL  is the sub-key of first round for KL. 
Consequently, it needs to solve a system of equations for 
recovering unknown sub-keys. 
Based on key schedule, if 1K is known, the sub-key 1KL  
of the first round and 3KI of the second round, etc will be 
known, where ( )8765432 K,K,K,K,K,K,K,K=K 1  is 
the main key of the cipher for producing key schedule. 
In our algorithm, we guess FL function sub-keys for the 
first two round, then using FO function equations (3-6), the 
other sub-keys can be computed. In fact, in the first two 
rounds, these FL sub-keys are 432 K,K,K,K1 . We represent 
our proposed algorithm in which the unknown key values show 
by capital letters. 
Algorithm 3:  
  
Given ( ) ( )RL0RL C,C=C,P,P=P0  
     Find every { }12810,K ∈  s.t 
( ) 0round2 C=K,PKASUMI 0−  
 
  For ( ) { }641 10,k,k,k,k 432 ∈ do 
        ( )1L RKL,PFL=a : ; 
        RL PC=b ⊕: ; 
        LC=c : ; 
        ( )2LR1 RKL,PCFL=d ⊕: − ; 
           Solve the following equations, 
                     ( ) ( )4RL5LR k',KaFIb=K',kaFIa 8652 ⊕⊕⊕⊕ <<<<  
( )8RL1 K',bbFIK= ⊕⊕137 −<<  
( ) ( )5RL6LR K',KcFId=K',kcFIc 8753 ⊕⊕⊕⊕ <<<<  
( )1RL1 k',ddFIK= ⊕⊕138 −<<  
It can be shown that if we would be able to find some part 
of keys, the other part of key can be computed uniquely. In this 
algorithm, when we find 6K , sub-key 5K can be computed 
from the first equation of algorithm 2. Using the second 
equation of algorithm 2,  8K,K7  can be computed. 
For correctness, these sub-key values should be check with 
the additional check equation in the second part of the first 
equation of algorithm 2.  
It should be noted that, in algorithm 2, solving strategy can 
be every appropriate strategy for solving equations. For 
example we can replace this strategy with exhaustive search or 
algebraic methods to find 6K  and then compute the rest of 
sub-key values. 
Complexity of the algorithm 2 depends on solving strategy. 
In the worst case, if exhaustive search method is used, the 
complexity of algorithm will be 802 which is the best one with 
regards to number of key bits. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Since KASUMI block cipher has 64-bit block length and 
128-bit key length, based on birthday paradox, when a fixed 
input encrypts with 322 different keys, there will be at least 
two equal cipher-text with probability more than ½. With P=0 
(plain-text with 64 bit zero), there are at least two keys that 
encryption of P lead to same cipher-text. 
Using such keys, we get output of the sixth round 
KASUMI; we wrote equations for last two round and the 
results are compared. We run our algorithm on 4,6,7-rounds 
KASUMI separately and obtain some equivalence keys. For 6-
round KASUMI, we found three keys with same cipher-text. It 
can be inferred that 6-round KASUMI shows more non-
random properties and it can be vulnerability for KASUMI 
block cipher, since we expected two keys with same cipher 
with considering 232  different keys. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this respect, we proposed a new attack on block cipher 
algorithms with key length greater than block length, if it 
would be possible to efficiently classify the key space of 
corresponding block cipher. In fact, the complexity of attack 
will be { }( )nkn ,maxO −22  where n is block length and k is 
key length. 
Some recommendations for continuing this work are as 
follow. 
1. Extend our algorithm to higher rounds of KASUMI 
block cipher. 
2. Solving algebraic equations obtained by 2-rounds 
KASUMI in an efficient way. 
3. Compute ( )jjii C'=C|C'=Cp  for j>i  where 
ji C,C  are the output of i'th-round KASUMI with 
same plain-text and different keys. 
4. Cryptanalysis of 4-rounds KASUMI block cipher with 
complexity of 642 . 
5. Classification of the key space of other cipher 
algorithms such as IDEA, 3DES, AES-256 with key 
length greater than block length. 
6. Combining this method with other known attack to 
achieve a near practical attack algorithm.  
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
 
Plain-text=0 
 Key=0xF1D941159CA8B6238135DACB8A370940 
 Cipher-text=0x2DBCDA8D84CDAD86 
  
--->> c1: left=0, right=db16eed5 
--->> c2: left=db16eed5, right=48d17eb6 
--->> c3: left=48d17eb6, right=2ebddad4 
--->> c4: left=2ebddad4, right=7b006cf8 
--->> c5: left=7b006cf8, right=d8805ffd 
--->> c6: left=d8805ffd, right=9f570e58 
--->> c7: left=9f570e58, right=84cdad86 
--->> c8: left=84cdad86, right=2dbcda8d 
  
Plain-text=0 
Key= 0xCAFF6AC383136437A70C4560AC98CE9F 
 Cipher-text= 0x2DBCDA8D84CDAD86 
   
--->> c1: left=0, right=aa108129 
--->> c2: left=aa108129, right=ec2e85a9 
--->> c3: left=ec2e85a9, right=309e5e7b 
--->> c4: left=309e5e7b, right=8f1313fb 
--->> c5: left=8f1313fb, right=2b23dcc6 
--->> c6: left=2b23dcc6, right=9b7de2ee 
--->> c7: left=9b7de2ee, right=84cdad86 
--->> c8: left=84cdad86, right=2dbcda8d 
 
 
Where “ci” is the output of round I in the KASUMI block 
cipher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
